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Many communities seek to encourage the redevelopment of sites that are idle or underused because of potential contamination (known as "brownfields"). Redevelopment of these sites is desirable because they are a disamenity and seen as a substitute for use of relatively pristine land Environmental liability -in particular, the threat of being compelled to pay for cleanup of contamination -is perceived as a significant barrier to redevelopment. The respondents to the USCM survey cited liability as second only to lack of cleanup funding as the major obstacle to redevelopment. In 2001, Congress passed the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, which funded and codified an existing EPA grant and loan program for cleanup of brownfields and included several provisions to reduce the presumed liability deterrent. Reuse of contaminated land remains an active issue for state and federal policy in the U.S. and abroad (Reisch, 2003; Grimski and Ferber, 2001 ).
Despite the perception of a problem, theoretical questions have been raised about the impact of liability in discouraging redevelopment (Boyd et al., 1996; Segerson, 1993 Segerson, , 1994 . Much of the policy literature fails to consider real estate price adjustments in face of expected liability and thus may overstate the deterrent to redevelopment. Empirical questions about the role of liability also remain. Urban and industrial decline long predates modern environmental laws, so liability can be at best a partial explanation for underused industrial land. Previous literature has explored the effect of liability on prices but not on "mothballing" of land, with a few exceptions (McGrath, 2000; Schoenbaum, 2002) .
In this paper, I use data on cities across the US to estimate the effects of variation in environmental liability on prices and vacancy rates of industrial land and on reported brownfield acreage.
Most industrial land is potentially contaminated (Noonan and Vidich, 1992 ) and thus may be affected by liability, even if not formally designated as a brownfield; however, the brownfield desig-1 nation may also apply to land contaminated by other uses. 1 The variation in liability comes from differences in state liability regimes, including whether they rely on strict liability and on joint and several liability. As explained below, these regimes affect the level and the distribution of expected private cleanup costs. States adopted and rescinded both forms of liability in the period in question, facilitating a panel data analysis. In addition, the effects of liability laws are compared across cities that differ in the likelihood of contamination to introduce intrastate as well as interstate variation. This paper builds on the existing empirical literature in a few ways. First, it focuses on vacancy of industrial land and reported brownfield acreage, variables of policy interest. It is the first study to look at these quantity measures that does not use spatial heterogeneity in historical contamination as its explanatory variable. Second, it analyzes the effects of alternative liability rules and thus provides direct information on plausible policy reforms: complete elimination of liability is unlikely (and a history of contamination cannot be reversed), but some states have eliminated joint and several liability, and the U.S. federal government and many European countries have moved to restrict it. Third, it studies both urban and suburban data and thus provides some insight into not just the deterrent effect on redevelopment, but also substitution of greenfields.
I find a negative effect of joint and several liability on industrial real estate prices in central cities, with a reduction in prices of 14%, and a positive effect of joint and several liability on industrial vacancy rates, which is also confined to central cities. One cannot reject no effect of strict liability on either prices or vacancy rates. Tests do not find evidence of policy endogeneity for either the price or vacancy equations, lending support to the estimated coefficients. The results are inconclusive on the question of greenfield substitution.
The paper also analyzes the USCM survey, the one national data set on reported brownfields acreage. The survey has only been conducted over a limited time and does not standardize the definition of brownfields. However, the results provide some validation of the results for vacant industrial land. Reported brownfield acreage is higher with joint and several liability, but not with strict liability.
The outline of the paper is as follows. The next section discusses reasons that liability may deter redevelopment and previous theoretical and empirical research in more detail. It also advances hypotheses about the effects of alternative liability rules. Section 2 describes the data on state policies, real estate markets, and other economic conditions merged for the analyses. Section 3 presents panel data estimates of equations for industrial land prices and vacancy rates and tests for the endogeneity of public policies. Section 4 describes the data set that was assembled around the four years of the USCM survey and results from equations estimated on these data. A final section briefly concludes with policy implications.
Liability as a deterrent to redevelopment
Under the federal Superfund and most state programs, liability for cleanup of contaminated sites may be imposed on a number of parties, including past and present owners of the site, as well as parties that contributed or transported contaminants to the site. 2 The purchaser of land bears the risk of liability should the site turn out to be contaminated. In addition, the original owner may not find its liability eliminated by the sale, given the inclusion of past landowners among the liable parties. This section discusses studies of the effects of liability on redevelopment and then considers their implications for specific liability rules.
Previous research on liability and redevelopment
The previous literature suggests four reasons that liability might not just lower land prices, "capitalizing" liability, but also deter redevelopment.
First, sellers of land and potential buyers may have asymmetric information about the level of contamination and the nature of the required cleanup. As Boyd et al. (1996) and Segerson (1994) argue, the resulting adverse selection may be a source of underuse of old industrial land. Although insurance for buyers' cleanup costs has become increasingly available, this market too is likely to be imperfect. Second, Boyd et al. examine what they call "imperfect detection," in which the government (and potentially even the owner) does not know about contamination until redevelopment, and "imperfect enforcement," in which the government does not enforce cleanup liability for idle sites.
In these circumstances, the sale of the property or requests for development permits may cause the owner to bear cleanup costs it could otherwise escape. If the cost of cleanup exceeds the value of the site clean, the property may go undeveloped.
Third, Segerson (1993) explores the effects of the "judgment proof problem," the possibility that parties may escape full liability through bankruptcy. In Segerson's model, without judgment proof parties, sales will be efficient regardless of whether the liability is transferred, i.e., whether it continues to reside with the seller or is partly or fully taken by the buyer. But with judgment proof parties, the extent of this shifting (and thus liability rules and rules on disclosure) affect the efficiency of the outcome. Segerson (1994) applies her earlier analysis to the incentives to clean up contamination before sale. Although Segerson shows that the effect of liability on sales is theoretically ambiguous, the legal rules in place largely shift liability to buyers, who are likely to have deeper pockets than current owners. Thus, a deterrent effect seems the likely implication of her model in practice.
Fourth, Chang and Sigman (2005) identify several deterrent effects that derive specifically from joint and several liability. Joint and several liability allows the government to hold any party liable for all of the cleanup costs regardless of its share of responsibility; this party may then sue any remaining liable parties for their share. Chang and Sigman discuss four different effects, all of which result from the increase in the number of defendants with sale of the property. For example, at sites with multiple liable parties, a sale may shift some third-party liability to the buyer. In addition, the buyer and seller may have collectively greater expected liability than the seller alone when the outcomes of the government's potential lawsuits are imperfectly correlated 4 among the different liable parties. Thus, joint and several liability in particular may be a culprit in any deterrent effect from liability.
Empirical research.
A few previous studies have explored empirical determinants of redevelopment. 3 McGrath (2000) examines the sales prices and likelihood of redevelopment of industrial parcels in Chicago as a function of the probability of contamination, which he derives from historical land use. McGrath finds a price reduction of about $1 million per acre and, comparing this value to typical cleanup costs, suggests that the costs are fully (or even over-) capitalized. He also compares sites that sold for new industrial uses with sites that sold for current use and finds evidence that redevelopment was discouraged. However, this definition of redevelopment is narrow: most policy-makers are concerned about the "mothballing" of land, rather than the question of change in use. McGrath's study conditions on a transaction taking place and thus cannot address the broader question. Schoenbaum (2002) provides the most rigorous previous examination of land vacancy. She constructs a history of land use in an industrially-zoned area in Baltimore. Categorizing some land as brownfields in 1963 and in 1999, she finds no evidence that either status affects the likelihood of vacancy in 1999. However, identification of the brownfield effect is potentially confounded with spatial heterogeneity; parcels with geographic advantages (for example, proximity to a highway) may be more intensively used and thus be both more likely to be brownfields and to be used again later. This concern is supported by the positive association between land values and brownfield status in her study.
Other studies focus on prices only. Jackson (2002) choice analysis, they find that protection from third-party lawsuits is worth 22% of the return on investment at the hypothetical site and cleanup liability protection is worth 16%. These stated preference studies, however, cannot diagnose whether liability causes only price adjustments or also has an effect on quantities.
Effects of alternative liability rules
In the empirical analysis, variation in the extent of liability derives from the rules used to impose liability. In particular, the empirical analysis focuses on two dimensions of liability rules: whether liability is strict and whether it is joint and several. In this section, I discuss hypotheses about the relationship of these rules to redevelopment.
Strict liability means that any action that causes contamination may give rise to liability; by contrast, negligence (or "at fault") rules trigger liability only if precaution falls below some legal standard of care. Strict liability should increase expected private cleanup costs by expanding the set of sites at which private parties may be held liable. Under a negligence rule, parties will only find themselves liable only if they fail to exercise the legal standard of care (however the state defines this concept) in avoiding or cleaning up contamination. Under a strict liability rule, the government may also find it less costly to bring suits because its information requirements are lower, reinforcing the incentives from its higher expected awards.
Earlier empirical research supports this view. Previous papers find evidence of higher precaution with strict liability -reduced spills Austin, 1999b, 2002) and fewer violations of hazardous waste laws (Stafford, 2003) . 4 These results are consistent with expected liability costs that are higher with strict liability.
Joint and several liability may raise expected liability for developers for several reasons. As mentioned above, Chang and Sigman (2005) discuss ways that the increase in the number of liable parties under joint and several liability creates disincentives for sale when all parties are solvent.
In addition, joint and several liability obliges private parties to pick up "orphan shares," costs attributable to parties that have gone bankrupt; these costs would be paid by the government under non-joint, "several only," liability. Probst et al. (1995) estimate a 14% average orphan share at federal Superfund sites (excluding entirely orphan sites), so these costs may be substantial.
Data
Data from several sources were combined to yield a panel on real estate markets, liability regimes, and economic conditions across cities.
State liability rules
All U.S. states have "superfund" programs that address liability and funding for cleanup of contaminated sites not covered under the federal Superfund program or the federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). 5 States vary in the nature of the liability rules they apply.
Landowners and other parties face two liability regimes, the regime in their state and the federal law. However, state liability, designed to capture sites neglected by the federal government, may be the relevant liability threat for run-of-the-mill industrial sites. These sites do not have the largescale contamination that would qualify them for the federal program. When cleanup is undertaken under state programs, federal officials almost never intervene and developers do not ask for federal officials to sign off on cleanup plans (Boyle, 2005) .
The longest history of these policies is available from a series of approximately biennial studies 
Land data
The Society of Industrial and Office Realtors' (SIOR) annual Comparative Statistics of Industrial and Office Real Estate Markets has data for many U.S. cities on prices of industrial real estate and vacancies. These data are available annually beginning in the early 1980s. The SIOR reports the expert opinion of local realtors rather than transaction data. Reliance on experts may add noise because of the influence of respondents' impressions, but may also reduce the noise in price data that a few large sales might have generated in some of the smaller urban areas.
For many cities, the SIOR data provide separate central city and suburban price and vacancy rates. Suburban sites may be less likely to be contaminated than urban sites and thus provide a comparison group. 8 In addition, a frequent argument for brownfield redevelopment is that firms would otherwise substitute suburban for urban sites. The suburban data permit a direct test of this hypothesis, at least to the extent that the substitution would be toward suburban sites within the same metropolitan area.
Industrial land was chosen to represent land potentially affected by liability for several reasons.
First, data are available for many cities over a long period. Second, almost all old industrial sites have some "environmental issues." Noonan and Vidich (1992) surveyed environmental engineering firms to determine the probability of contamination for different land uses. They report very high probabilities for all the industrial uses: land used for "heavy industrial manufacturing" has a probability of contamination of 88% and "light industrial manufacturing" and "industrial parks" have 75% probabilities. Thus, it is highly likely that land zoned as industrial is contaminated, especially in center cities where it may have seen extensive previous use. Third, liability might cause a general cooling of industrial real estate markets, which could be more costly than its effect on a few high-profile brownfields. In particular, adverse selection might be a problem for the market as a whole, but not for sites with well-established contamination. The disadvantage of studying industrial land is that land with other sources of contamination, such as ubiquitous brownfields from abandoned auto repair shops, falls outside the analysis. For this reason, designated brownfields are considered later. Table 1 reports mean prices and vacancy rates for industrial land in central city and suburban locations. Prices are substantially higher and vacancy rates lower in the suburbs. The table also distinguishes both variables for observations with and without joint and several liability. Center city and suburban prices are lower and vacancy rates higher with joint and several liability; the disparities are smaller between suburban values than urban values, consistent with an effect that depends on the likelihood of contamination. Tables 2 and 3 provide a "difference in difference" analysis of changes in joint and several liability. For cities with both urban and suburban data, the tables present the ratio of urban to suburban land prices (Table 2 ) and urban to suburban vacancy rates (Table 3) The cities are divided according to whether their states always used (or did not use) joint and several liability or switched regimes "permanently" during the study period. For all groups of cities in Table 2 , urban prices fell relative to suburban prices over the time period. However, the relative fall in urban prices was substantially smaller for the group that left joint and several liability than those that remained. Similarly, among cities that initially did not have joint and several liability, cities that began it had a greater relative reduction than those that did not. A similar story emerges in Table 3 . Vacancy rates in the center fell relative to the suburbs in cities where joint and several liability ended, whereas cities that maintained joint and several liability saw a relative increase in vacancies. Cities that began joint and several liability had an increase in their relative urban vacancy rate, whereas those that never had it experienced a fall. The differences, therefore, are consistent with a reduction in land prices and increase in vacancy rates from joint and several liability, although none of the differences are close to statistically significant. Sample sizes are small, especially in the transition categories.
Other explanatory variables
Other explanatory variables reflect economic conditions in the city, government services and taxes, influences on expected cleanup costs other than liability rules, and descriptions of other state environmental policies.
For economic conditions, the equations include the unemployment rate, manufacturing employment, and city population. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) provides data by city on unemployment rates and manufacturing employment; Wheaton and Torto (1990) suggest that the latter plays an important role in industrial real estate demand. Table 1 reports that the mean of this (.137) [9] [9]
Note: Numbers in square brackets are the number of urban/suburban pairs with data. Note: Numbers in square brackets are the number of urban/suburban pairs with data.
variable is much larger in states without joint and several liability than in states with it; however, the difference is almost entirely driven by the upper tail and the medians are similar. The population for the metropolitan area, from the Census, is also included; the entire metropolitan area is used, regardless of whether the area is center city or suburbs.
The services provided and taxes collected by the city also contribute to real estate demand.
In particular, surveys find that access to transportation is a major determinant of firms' location choices (Robertson, 1999 average more individual legislators' data than Senate scores, reducing noise, and also can adjust more rapidly to changes in sentiment because of the potential for faster turnover in the House. As Table 1 reports, this variable is higher in states with joint and several liability, suggesting that it may be seen as the "greener" choice.
The measure of regulatory stringency is Levinson's industry-weighted abatement cost index (Levinson, 2000) . Levinson adjusts the data from the U.S. Census survey on Pollution Abatement by county, which is almost always reported in the Superfund data. County-level historical manufacturing data were also aggregated to the SMSA level.
Costs and Expenditures (PACE) for the two-digit industry composition in the state. The resulting index has the advantage of varying over time and capturing not just legislative differences between states but also differences in monitoring and enforcement. A major disadvantage is that it ends in 1994 when the Census stopped conducting its annual survey. The series is linearly extrapolated for later years. The index differs very little between observations with and without joint and several liability, which is somewhat surprising given the higher LCV scores in joint and several states.
Econometric analysis
In this section, I present estimates of the relationship between liability rules and two real estate market outcomes: prices and vacancy rates. The first two subsections use fixed effects estimators to capture unobserved heterogeneity, but otherwise assume exogeneity of the policy regime. In the last subsection, I discuss a test of exogeneity of liability regimes.
The equations are estimated only on data from 1989 through 2000. Because it is unclear when in the year the ELI survey describes, I use a one year lag to assure that the variable has the value relevant when planning for any transaction occurred. Thus, the remaining observations begin in 1990, which is convenient because it is also the first year in which manufacturing employment and highway density are available and avoids some complications from redefinition of urban areas between decennial Censuses.
For both price and vacancy rates, the estimated equations have the form
where variables are as follows: p it is the price (or later the vacancy rates); L it is a vector of state liability rules; E it are economic conditions, such as unemployment and population; G it are government variables (highway density and real estate taxes); and S it are measures of state environmental policy. The equations also include a city fixed effect, α i ; Hausman tests reject random effects.
Year effects, β t , capture changes in interest rates and other national real estate trends. A log-log function form is used to allow variables that reflect the scale of activity, such as population, to interact multiplicatively with other variables.
The error is allowed to have an AR(1) structure within a panel,
This error structure may capture not only the gradual change in unobservable characteristics, but also some tendency for slow adjustment in the opinions of the realtors who report data. The test suggested by Wooldridge (2002, p. 275) for autocorrelation in fixed effects models strongly rejects the hypotheses of no autocorrelation for both sets of equations. Estimates of ρ are large, as reported in the tables. Table 4 presents estimates of the relationship between liability rules and prices. Four different equations are shown in Table 4 . The first three equations restrict the sample to center city data only. This restriction is intended to focus attention on properties where some contamination is likely. The third equation in Table 4 includes all data from the SIOR, including both center city and suburban data.
Panel data analysis: Prices
I discuss the coefficients on the liability variables first and then discuss the other covariates. Strict liability is not observed to have an effect on prices. In column (1), the coefficient on strict liability is positive, but small in magnitude and statistically insignificant. The failure to find effects The next two equations in Table 4 explores interactions of legal regimes with the intensity of contamination, introducing intra-state variation into the identification of the effects. In column (2), the log of the density of hazardous waste sites in the metropolitan area is the measure of intensity of contamination. The point estimate on the interaction with joint and several liability is negative, consistent with the hypothesis that joint and several liability has a larger negative effect on prices the more likely property is to be contaminated. However, the two joint and several liability variables are jointly significant only at 10% and the interaction term is not individually significant.
For strict liability, the effects remain insignificant and opposite in sign.
In column (3), the intensity of contamination is measured by the geographic density of historical (1940-1970) manufacturing employment. The interaction of this variable with joint and several liability also produces a negative coefficient as expected. Although the level of the joint and several liability is positive, the net effect at the sample median manufacturing employment is a reduction in price of 14%, which is statistically significant and very close in magnitude to the main effect in column (1). The two joint and several liability coefficients are jointly statistically significant at 5%. Thus, the results are consistent with a stronger negative association where contamination is more likely.
In the fourth equation, suburban observations are added. The liability rules are interacted with a dummy for center city location to allow differentiated effects. The point estimates suggest a negative effect of joint and several liability overall that is strongest in city centers. However, neither coefficient is individually statistically significant and the two joint and several coefficient are jointly significant only at 10%. The sum of the two effects (the net effect in center cities) is similar in magnitude to the center city effect in the first equation. With negative point estimates for suburban areas, the results do not suggest substitution of suburban sites for central sites within the same metropolitan area in response to joint and several liability. Effects of strict liability remain statistically insignificant, small in magnitude, and perverse in sign.
Timing issues are a concern for these and other equations: a prospective property developer will care about expected current and future liability. Current liability rules will be a component of these expectations both for its direct effect (cleanup is likely to be required immediately before development can begin) and also for its indications about the future. However, unobserved expectations about the future may also play a role. If rules change over time, developers respond to future expected rules that differ less across states than current rules; failure to measure expected future policy results might would result in coefficients closer to zero than the coefficients would be on permanent rules.
One quick check for timing effects is to remove cities in states that temporarily changed rules in the study period; these are cities in Maryland, Kansas, Illinois, and Ohio. Although only a small number of observations are dropped, they are influential with the "within" estimator. Dropping these observations in the equation in the first column of Table 4 does not markedly change the point estimates, but does render the coefficient on joint and several liability statistically significant at only 10%. 
Panel data analysis: Vacancy rates
The second dependent variable of interest is the vacancy rate of industrial space. 11 As above, the estimated equations include city fixed effects and allow an AR(1) process for the errors. Equations are estimated that are limited to center cities and that include suburbs as well.
Liability variables.
In the first equation in Table 5 with center cities only, joint and several liability has a statistically significant positive effect on vacancy rates. The magnitude of this coefficient is substantial: it corresponds to about a 40% increase in vacancy rates in the presence of joint and several liability. Although this effect seems large, vacancies may represent a small share of industrial space, so the effect as a share of the full market is less dramatic, accounting for less than 4% of the market. Consistent with the price equations above, the equations do not point to an effect of strict liability on vacancy rates. The point estimate on strict liability is negative, contrary to expectations, and not significant.
In columns (2) and (3), the interaction between joint and several liability and measures of the likelihood of contamination produce positive point estimates, consistent with the idea that joint and several liability is a greater deterrent in places with higher contamination risk. Neither interaction term is individually statistically significant; however, the level and interaction are jointly statistically significant in column (2) with suspected site density, but not in column (3) with historical manufacturing employment. As in the price equations, strict liability and its interaction are not jointly statistically significant and the net sign of interactions are inconsistent.
11 SIOR provides both vacant square feet and vacancy rates. I focus on the latter because the data do show dramatic year-to-year changes in available space, presumably due to changes in the definitions employed by the realtors who report each year, whereas vacancy rates exhibit less volatility. In any event, changes in the reporting realtor are unlikely to be systematic. With fixed effects, using the absolute vacant space did not change the conclusions of the analysis. With suburban data added in column (4), joint and several liability and its interaction with center city are jointly significant at 5%. The net effect in center cities continues to be positive as before. Interestingly, the point estimate on joint and several liability outside of central cities is negative, although not statistically significant. A negative effect of joint and several liability on vacancy outside central cities might be consistent with substitution of suburban land in places where urban land is subject to high liability costs.
For strict liability, the coefficient is positive, but only in suburban areas. The effect is not statistically significant, however, so is probably consistent with the general conclusion that strict liability does not have a detectable effect on real estate markets.
Other covariates. As with the price equations, few of the other covariates have statistically significant coefficients in Table 5 . One pattern that is interesting is that the variables reflecting state environmental stringency -state superfund lawyers, LCV score, and abatement costsall increase vacancy rates; these results would be consistent with the somewhat elusive interstate pollution haven effect (Levinson, 1996) . However, of these variables, only Superfund lawyers is statistically significant and only in the final equation. This coefficient is consistent with increases in vacant land with more aggressive liability enforcement, but conflicts with the (unexpected) positive effect of this variable in the price equation.
Endogeneity of liability rules
A nonrandom assignment of liability regimes is a concern for interpretation of the analyses. Although exploiting the panel structure of the data may help to address endogeneity of liability rules, time-varying unobserved heterogeneity remains a potential problem. Liability rules may reflect other unmeasured attributes, such as the amount of public concern about contaminated sites.
The rules may also depend on progress on the brownfields issue if states adjust their rules in ways they hope will encourage redevelopment. However, the choice of liability regime is not mentioned as a factor in brownfields in the policy or legal literature; to my knowledge, the possibility has only been raised in the technical papers of Segerson (1993 Segerson ( , 1994 . Arguments about the choice of liability regime almost always turn on the trade-off between perceived fairness of expansive liability and the resources it achieves for cleanup. Thus, reverse causality seems to be a less likely source of endogeneity than unobserved heterogeneity.
In this subsection, I explore the endogeneity in the liability rules, using an instrumental variable approach. The previous literature suggests three instruments. First, Alberini and Austin (1999a) study the determinants of liability regimes, focusing on the role of industry mix and environmental preferences. In particular, they find that the number of mining establishments in the state predicts adoption of strict liability, with differential effects for large and small firms. I construct a time series on the number of large and small mining establishments by state from the 1992 and 1997
Census of Mineral Industries, with forward and backward imputation for the remaining years. When these instruments are used to test for exogeneity of the liability rules, the results fail to reject exogeneity in both equations. Table 6 reports the Davidson-MacKinnon version of the (1) in Tables 4 and 5 .
Hausman test for the hypotheses of exogeneity of strict and joint and several liability, using the instruments proposed. The test statistic is moderate for the price equations, leaving the possibility of endogeneity, but very low for the vacancy rate equations. 12 In evaluating these tests, it is worth noting that the instruments seem relatively successful. 
Reported brownfields
The analysis above uses data on the overall industrial real estate market, taking the view that any used industrial land -even that not formally labelled as a brownfield -may be subject to the effects of liability. However, the effects of liability rules on reported brownfields may also be of interest, so this section conducts analyses of these effects.
Data on reported brownfields
The best available data set on reported brownfield acreages is from surveys conducted by the U.S. The other covariates are as similar as possible to those used before. Population figures derive from the USCM data itself, so are specific to the reporting locale. For several other characteristics, many locales are too small for city-level data to be available. The USCM locales were therefore matched to one or more counties based on populated place names. Local variables were then assigned based on county-level data, with rates calculated over a multi-county aggregate in the few instances where the populated place spans several counties. These variables include local unemployment rates and the manufacturing share of employment from the BLS. 13 The data on density of suspected contaminated sites and historical manufacturing data discussed earlier was also merged by county.
Conference of
A measure of local real estate taxes was constructed from the USCM data. Respondents to Table 7 provides summary statistics for the full data set and for the subsets with and without joint and several liability. In the full data set, the cities claim an average of 723 acres of brownfield sites. The average city has a population of 195,000, but the median is lower because the range in city size goes up to 8 million (New York).
A large difference appears in reported mean brownfield acres between the cities with and without joint and several liability. Although the mean brownfield acres in the joint and several cities is much larger, the distributions of acres appear almost identical until the 95th percentile, where the joint and several cities include a few cities reporting tens of thousands of acres. Both groups have medians (reported in the first row of Table 7 ) of about 100 brownfield acres. 15 Cities with joint and several liability differ from the other cities along a number of dimensions.
The former are larger, more industrial, and have more suspected contaminated sites. 16 Unlike in the earlier data, joint and several liability is also associated with more aggressive contaminated site programs, as measured by the number of state superfund lawyers. These cities are also located in greener states, as represented by the average LCV score for the state. Liability variables. In the first column in Table 8 , the coefficients on the liability rules show a similar to pattern to the pattern found in the overall vacancy rate. Joint and several liability has a statistically significant and surprisingly large effect in raising the number of acres of brownfields.
Results with reported brownfields data
The coefficient of .510 corresponds to 67% more brownfields with joint and several liability. The point estimates thus suggests a larger effect than the 40% increase found for vacancy rates; the comparison may be consistent with stronger liability effects on sites with greater likelihood of contamination. On the other hand, the coefficient on strict liability is not statistically significant 15 Dropping cities reporting more than 10,000 acres did not substantively change the estimates in the next subsection. 16 The average density of contaminated sites is much greater in this data set (.24 per square mile) than in the general real estate market data (.09 per square mile). The disparity is largely in the upper tail; the medians are similar (.07 versus .05 respectively). The difference seems to result from greater ability to pinpoint counties in the USCM data set. For example, the highest values in the USCM data (3 sites per square mile) are for cities located in a single county in Northern New Jersey. In the earlier data, a handful of Northern New Jersey counties are in a single observation. A concern with this analysis is the role of the tax rate variable, which enters with a counterintuitive negative, but very precisely estimated, coefficient. To construct this variable, reported foregone taxes are divided by the number of brownfield acres to calculate a tax rate. However, the consequence is that the inverse of the left-hand-side variable is on the right-hand-side. The final equation in the table drops the tax variable to avoid this problem. The point estimate falls somewhat with this exclusion, but remains statistically significant. About half of the reduction in the point estimate results from including observations previously excluded for lack of tax data.
The equations in Table 8 Other variables. The relationships of reported brownfields acreage with some of the other variables are also interesting. Reported brownfield acreage increases with the city's population, but with an elasticity less than one. This coefficient suggests that the smaller cities face greater relative burdens from brownfields than larger cities, all else equal. The regressions do not point to any relationship with unemployment rates or the manufacturing share of employment.
Somewhat surprisingly, the number of sites reported to the Superfund inventory also does not have a statistically significant coefficient and its point estimate is negative. The number of inventory sites has sometimes been used as measure of the number of brownfields (e.g., Simons, 1998 ).
This result suggests that it does not agree well with city governments' assessment of their brownfields problem. Old manufacturing employment fairs somewhat better as a predictor of reported brownfields, with a positive coefficient. However, the coefficient is still not statistically significant and far below the unitary elasticity one might expect.
Finally, the coefficients on the two state environmental stringency variables have signs that suggest differing effects. On the one hand, more state superfund lawyers per capita raises the number of brownfields, perhaps because more aggressive programs identify more sites or raise the costs of developing contaminated sites. On the other hand, states with higher LCV scores have fewer brownfields acres (in all but the first equation). The latter effect could be the result of more stringent controls on the behaviors that give rise to contamination or of more extensive previous cleanups.
Conclusions
The results of the empirical analysis are consistent with the view that joint and several liability not only drives down industrial real estate prices, but also increases the vacancy of industrial land.
Both the price effect and quantity effects are concentrated in central cities, as might be expected.
One cannot rule out the possibility of substitution of greenfields for brownfields in cities with joint and several liability, but the estimated equations do not provide positive evidence of this effect. In addition, the results provide little support for either a price or a quantity effect from strict liability: I speculate that standards for due care are sufficiently high or uncertain that negligence rules provide little protection from liability. In analysis of a limited data set on reported brownfields, joint and several liability is associated with more brownfields, but strict liability is not.
The results thus suggest that liability is at least partially capitalized but still deters redevelopment. The reason for the deterrence may be a general problem, such as adverse selection or judgement proofness. It may also be specific to joint and several liability. With either cause, the results provide an argument for reducing reliance on joint and several liability. However, joint and several liability does have advantages that should be weighed against these costs. It provides the government with greater resources for cleanup and may facilitate settlement (Chang and Sigman, 30 2002) . A targeted approach that provides protection from joint and several liability only when properties are sold might therefore be more desirable than broader liability relief.
